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Law and Misdirection in the Debate over
Affirmative Action
Samuel Issacharoff
A few years back, in the throes of the Hopwood litigation, I
wrote an article that simply asked, "Can Affirmative Action Be
Defended?"1 The article reflected the efforts I had undertaken,
together with my Texas colleagues Douglas Laycock and Charles
Alan Wright, to formulate a defense of a targeted program of af-
firmative action at a formerly segregated state university. That
defense, as part of the protracted and now concluded Hopwood
litigation, has drawn to a close. The result is a controversial and
far-reaching decision of one Fifth Circuit panel,' open skepticism
by a second Fifth Circuit panel,' clear division on that court about
the en banc merits of the case,' an unfortunate procedural quag-
mire that frustrated repeated efforts to secure Supreme Court
review,5 in the Hopwood litigation, but is now before the Supreme
Court in the cases challenging affirmative action at the Univer-
sity of Michigan.' At the time of the earlier article, Hopwood
stood alone as a direct confrontation between modern affirmative
action and the incomplete legacy of post-Brown v Board of Educa-
1 Harold R Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School. I am
indebted to Michael Dorf, Cynthia Estlund, William Forbath, Douglas Laycock, and Peter Schuck
for their helpful comments on this manuscript. Jennifer Morrison further provided the indispen-
sable research assistance. Nothing in this Article should be attributed to anyone but me.
1 Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action be Defended?, 59 Ohio St L J 669 (1998).
See Hopwood v Texas, 78 F3d 932, 944-46 (5th Cir 1996) (invalidating the University of
Texas Law School's affirmative action program on equal protection grounds).
3 See Hopwood v Texas, 236 F3d 256, 273-74 (5th Cir 2000) (rejecting Texas's argument
that remedying the effects of past discrimination throughout the state's public education system
was constitutionally permissible).
See Hopwood v Texas, 84 F3d 720, 721 (5th Cir 1996) (denying rehearing en banc with
seven judges dissenting).
' See Hopwood v Texas, 518 US 1033 (1996) (Ginsburg and Souter concurring) (refusing to
grant certiorari on the ground that petitioners challenged the rationale rather than the judgment
of the lower court).
6 See Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS
8677 (challenging law school admissions process); Gratz v Bollinger, 277 F3d 803 (6th Cir
2001), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS 8681 (challenging undergraduate admissions
process).
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tion7 equal protection law, most notably through the ambiguous
legacy of Bakke.8 By now, Hopwood has an accompanying body of
case law from Georgia,' Michigan"0 and Washington," all of which
has contributed much heat but little clarity to the ongoing debate
over the future of affirmative action.
This Article steps beyond simply asking whether affirmative
action is defensible under existing legal doctrine. The aim is to
push the debate over affirmative action beyond the narrow cate-
gories inherited from the Bakke-informed debates of the case law.
By looking more directly to the justifications for affirmative ac-
tion outside the Bakke framework, I want to depart from the way
much of the litigation and scholarship has addressed these is-
sues. This includes my earlier writing, which was largely an ex-
amination of how a defense strategy could be fashioned at a pub-
lic university that stood ambiguously as the inheritor of a tradi-
tion of state-imposed segregation at all levels of public education.
That defense, and the article it engendered, focused on the in-
complete elimination of the legacy of discrimination, reflected in
specific court orders and ongoing consent decree obligations of the
University of Texas and its law school.'2 Even then, it was clear
that the defense of an ongoing legal obligation to take affirmative
steps to integrate a particular university's student body was un-
doubtedly limited to a very small subset of the leading institu-
tions that engage in affirmative action. Moreover, as reflected in
the recent University of Georgia litigation, even the once-
7 347 US 483 (1954).
8 Regents of University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978).
" See Johnson v Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 263 F3d 1234, 1244-45 (11th
Cir 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's affirmative action program because it was not
narrowly tailored, but not reaching the question of whether diversity may ever serve as a compel-
ling interest).
10 See Grutter v Bollinger, 137 F Supp 2d 821, 853 (E D Mich 2001) (invalidating the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program and rejecting diversity as a compelling
state interest), revd, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002) (reversing ruling of unconstitutionality of Law
School admissions program), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS 8677; Gratz v Bollinger, 122 F
Supp 2d 811, 822 (E D Mich 2000) (upholding undergraduate admissions as operated from
1999 to 2001), initial hearing en banc granted, 277 F3d 803 (6th Cir 2001), cert granted at
2002 US LEXIS 8681.
" See Smith v University of Washington Law School, 233 F3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir 2000)
(holding that using race as one of several factors to attain a diverse student body is constitution-
ally permissible), cert denied, 532 US 1051 (2001).
12 See Hopwood v Texas, 861 F Supp 551, 554, 573 (W D Tex 1994), revd, 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir
1996). See also Issacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 681 (cited in note 1) ("We were able to persuade the
trial court that the vestiges of discrimination were not merely the lore of a bygone era.").
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segregated institutions are increasingly removed from that for-
mal discriminatory past.3
In the course of the earlier article, I expressed skepticism
about the broader question of the ability to defend affirmative
action under the equal protection standards inherited from
Bakke. 4 This skepticism was not primarily the result of the in-
creasing distance between past formal discrimination and the
highly institutionalized modern practice of affording preferences
in admissions to minority applicants. Rather, my skepticism was
based centrally upon the mismatch between the core function of
affirmative action-the continued integration of black Americans
into the mainstream of society-and the envelopment of legal
defenses for such programs under the ill-formed but rhetorically-
central diversity rationale. The key difficulty was that the lead-
ing institutions of higher education were continuing the societal
mission of remedying the exclusion of those whose marginaliza-
tion could be directly attributed to societal malevolence. But the
language of justification was not expressed "externally" in the
role these institutions play in preserving, enriching, and expand-
ing the nation's elites. Instead, the defense was almost exclu-
sively along lines of the "internal"-the needs of the academic
institutions for their educational purposes, narrowly defined.1" As
I previously explained, I find this defense critically flawed. The
diversity argument neither explains the overwhelming emphasis
of affirmative action programs on the admission of black appli-
cants, nor does it explain how affirmative action selection is actu-
ally undertaken in practice.
'3 See Johnson, 263 F3d at 1240 (noting that, according to the Office of Civil Rights, the
University of Georgia was in compliance with Title VI by 1989).
14 Justice Powell provided two possible justifications for race-conscious admissions: remedy-
ing historical discrimination and diversity. Bakke, 438 US at 307, 311-12. He indicated that ab-
sent a judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of constitutional or statutory violations and
subsequent remedial oversight the remedial justification would not stand. See id at 307. Thus,
overcoming the effects of past discrimination will give rise to a compelling interest in limited
contexts, primarily in the Southern states where the continuing effects of historical discrimination
are often easier to prove. Powell's second justification, diversity, is more widely available to insti-
tutions seeking to defend race-conscious admission schemes, but his conception of diversity as
something much broader than racial diversity insures that it will provide little justification for
programs that promote diversity merely by creating integrated student bodies. See id at 315 ('The
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifica-
tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important ele-
ment.").
" I borrow the terminology fi-om Dean Kronman. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a
Value in American Higher Education?, 52 Fla L Rev 861, 866 (2000) (discussing the difference
between "internal" and "external" goals).
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The developing case law addressing constitutional and statu-
tory challenges to affirmative action has framed the problem with
the diversity rationale in the classic formula of equal protection
law."8 For the most aggressive of courts, and here the initial Fifth
Circuit panel in Hopwood was undoubtedly the trailblazer, racial
diversity can never rise to the level of a compelling state inter-
est.7 Under this approach, which has found increasing echoes in
other decisions," even the classic understanding of Bakke as an
invitation to treat diversity as a compelling academic concern is
rejected. These decisions stress that Justice Powell's opinion did
not command the Court's divisions and has no binding preceden-
tial effect."9 For more cautious courts, diversity may well consti-
tute a compelling governmental interest, but as an affirmative
action rationale, it fails the narrow tailoring prong of equal pro-
tection strict scrutiny." For those courts that have actually im-
mersed themselves in the inner workings of affirmative action
admissions practices, the defect is the circular definition of diver-
sity as a predetermined commitment to a minimum level of mi-
nority representation.' Under the operation of any preferential
system capable of administrative implementation, the commit-
'" Thus far, the conservative public interest law firms that are orchestrating the legal chal-
lenge to affirmative action have directed their fire exclusively at public universities. Perhaps this
reflects an ideological commitment, inspired by libertarianism, to the principle that private insti-
tutions should be able to contract free from government or judicial oversight. I find little appeal in
this distinction for two reasons. First, it misstates the positive law under Title VI which statutorily
imposes the commands of equal protection on all educational institutions that accept federal fund-
ing in any form, see 42 USC § 2000d (1994)-a command that clearly includes every research
institution in the country. Second, and not simply as a function of the receipt of federal funding,
the elite universities of the U.S. are a major national resource that heavily define the social, cul-
tural, intellectual and political life of the country. The idea that such a major sector of the society
could stand independent of the societal commitment to non-discrimination is a principle that holds
no appeal, at least for me.
For a limited defense of the public/private distinction that would nonetheless impose a
duty of transparency on private institutions engaging in affirmative action, see Peter Schuck,
Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev 1, 86-92 (2002).
" See Hopwood, 78 F3d at 948 (stating that "the use of race to achieve a diverse student
body ... simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the steep standard of strict
scrutiny").
' See Grutter, 137 F Supp 2d at 849 ("[Diversity is not a compelling state interest because it
is not a remedy for past discrimination.").
' See Johnson, 263 F3d at 1245 (rejecting the assertion that Justice Powell's opinion is
binding).
20 See, for example, id at 1244-1245 (declining to resolve whether diversity may ever be a
compelling state interest, but finding that the program was not narrowly tailored).
21 See, for example, Grutter, 137 F Supp 2d at 842 (characterizing the University of
Michigan affirmative action program as a commitment to a set level of minority enroll-
ments).
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ment to diversity appears simply as a predefined commitment to
racial representation.
The most recent contribution to the case law comes with the
Sixth Circuit's affirmance of the constitutional propriety of the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program.
22
A substantial part of that court's 5-4 division turned on the ex-
tent to which Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke could be deemed a
controlling ruling on the use of diversity as a compelling state
interest." Once having determined that diversity bore the consti-
tutional imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Bakke, the Sixth
Circuit then found that the avoidance of a fixed numerical set-
aside provided constitutional protection, even if in practice the
use of an affirmative action plan yielded rather predictable
ranges of minority enrolled students.' Almost as if designed to
bring the difficulties of Bakke into stark relief, the facts of the
Michigan program showed that racial considerations raised the
admission of minority students in 2000 from 4 percent of the en-
tering class to 14.5 percent,' virtually the exact numbers that
separated the Harvard plan approvingly mentioned by Justice
Powell in Bakke (5 percent) from the Davis plan struck down in
Bakke (16 percent).6
Given the direct intercircuit conflict, some Supreme Court
review appeared inevitable, and will now be forthcoming in the
Michigan cases. Moreover, given that the courts of appeals have
split on the extent to which Bakke in general, and its endorse-
ment of diversity in particular, should be seen as governing law,
it is also likely the case that the next period of affirmative action
debates will continue to play out in the terms inherited from
Bakke-until the Supreme Court speaks. But, stepping away for
a minute from the conditions under which affirmative action is
debated today, perhaps it is worth contemplating whether these
should be the terms of engagement and further asking what role
legal doctrine has played in forcing the debate into these terms.
2 Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS
8677.
23 See id at 738-742. There is a direct conflict among the circuits over even the pre-
liminary question of how to read Bakke. See Smith, 233 F3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir 2000)
(ruling for the Ninth Circuit that Powell's opinion commands the Court in Bakke).
24 Grutter, 288 F3d at 748 ("[Rleliance on Bakke will always produce some percentage
range on minority enrollment.... These results are the logical consequence of reliance on
Bakke and establishment of an admission policy, like the Harvard plan, that attends to
the numbers and distribution of under-represented minority students.").
" Id at 737.
26 See Bakke, 438 US at 279.
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As Dean Anthony Kronman well formulates the law-inspired ele-
vation of the concept of diversity, "It is striking that a word which
a generation ago carried no particular moral weight and had, at
most, a modestly benign connotation, should in this generation
have become the most fiercely contested word in American higher
education."27
I suggest that diversity came to its current life' with the nar-
row window left open by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.a As-
suming that swing opinion to have the force of the Court, the de-
fenses of affirmative action were limited to either the internal
claim of educational product enhancement or the retrospective
claim of remedying institutional discrimination. In light of Jus-
tice Powell's later opinion in Wygant v Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,s° it was clear that no particular institution could claim the
need to overcome societal discrimination or disadvantage as the
basis for its affirmative action program."1 Once Wygant refused to
allow particular institutions to assume the mantle of overcoming
societal discrimination, universities had only two choices avail-
able: either they could claim to be remedying their own past dis-
27 Kronman, 52 Fla L Rev at 861 (cited in note 15).
2 The original invocation of diversity in the early part of the twentieth century has a
decidedly mixed origin. With the rise of meritocratic admissions after World War I, the Ivy
League world of the New England Brahmin elite found itself under siege by ambitious and
talented immigrant groups, with a heavy representation of Jews. The search for geo-
graphic and other "diverse" admissions factors was part of the self-conscious effort to ad-
dress what these schools termed "the Jewish problem." For a short, compelling account of
this complicated history, focusing on the rise of standardized tests, see Malcolm Gladwell,
Examined Life, New Yorker 86, 90-92 (Dec 17, 2001).
29 This is, of course, not a unique observation. See, for example, Terrence Sandalow, Minority
Preferences Reconsidered, 97 Mich L Rev 1874, 1905 (1999) ("Mhe importance of racial diversity
in the educational process has become something of a mantra in higher education circles in the
years since Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke."); Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative
Action, 85 Va L Rev 697, 729 (1999) (reviewing William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of
the River: Long-term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions
(Princeton 1998)) ("[D]iversity has quite clearly become the most heralded of all justifications for
affirmative action."). See also H. Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U Pa J Const L 573, 578 (2000)
(comparing the post-Bakke world to a child's game of "Simon Says," where the Supreme Court, as
Simon, has said to recast claims of discrimination into claims of diversity enhancement).
30 476 US 267 (1986).
" See id at 276 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy."). In City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469
(1989) (plurality opinion), Justice O'Connor mildly qualified this rule in the context of a
state actor seeking to overcome well-established private market discrimination in its own jurisdic-
tion: "Mhe city of Richmond has legislative authority over its procurement policies, and can use
its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the
particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 492. For elaboration of this point, see
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 Georgetown
L J 1, 80 (2000).
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crimination, or they could claim to be furthering the goals of di-
versity. As a practical matter, the first path was unlikely to bear
fruit. Even once-segregated universities had supplanted that
practice with two decades of racial preferences. In effect, the sole
justification for affirmative action became diversity. The end re-
sult was to channel all discussion of the reasons for affirmative
action into the now critical language of diversity. Despite the rhe-
torical force that diversity has come to have in providing a de-
fense for affirmative action programs, it suffers two critical de-
fects: (1) it defines neither the rationale for, nor operation of, af-
firmative action programs; and (2) it is proving remarkably vul-
nerable to exacting equal protection scrutiny, the recent Michi-
gan decision notwithstanding.
After having been involved in the Hopwood litigation for nine
years, I find a wearying quality to the debates over affirmative
action. This feeling is due not so much to the toils of litigation, for
my role in the case peaked years ago. The personal cost comes
more from the political defense of a valiant and well-intentioned
university program against claims that "we had it coming" or that
the Texas plan was uniquely ill-crafted, or even that the univer-
sity had no warrant to resist litigation." But the hollow tone of
the debate over the commitment to diversity is just as wearying.
My new home institution, Columbia Law School, is as abstractly
dedicated to the concept of diversity as any in the country. Yet,
among Columbia's sixty-five or so faculty members, there are but
a handful of Republicans, despite the fact that Republicans must
constitute about half of the national population.' Similarly, I
know few of my colleagues to be religiously devout despite the
clear prevalence of such views in the population-and I know
none of my colleagues to be fundamentalist Christians, the fast-
est growing religious minority in the country. Among my col-
leagues are many Jews but no Muslims, although the latter group
may outnumber the former in America and is now likely to face
the brunt of social opprobrium more directly than any other. I
12 For a dim recent rendition of this last argument, see Gabriel J. Chin, et al, Symposium:
Rethinking Racial Divides-Panel on Affirmative Action, 4 Mich J Race & L 195, 201, 202 (1998)
(describing the defense of the University of Texas's affirmative action plan as "recreational litiga-
tion" that put "the lives of people of color on the line for no good reason").
3This is consistent with the findings of Professor James Lindgren on the relative underrep-
resentation of Republicans on the faculties of American law schools, if somewhat more pro-
nounced. See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity (unpublished manuscript on file with author),
cited in Michael C. Dorf and Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U Colo
L Rev 924, 947 n 79 (2001).
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have now spent the majority of my professional life in the acad-
emy and I have seen the concept of diversity enshrined at the
highest levels of the academic pantheon. But in the endless dis-
cussions of diversity, I have never heard the term seriously en-
gaged on behalf of a Republican, a fundamentalist Christian, or a
Muslim.
The passage of time allows me to return to these issues with
somewhat greater distance than when Hopwood was in the full
bloom of litigation. In this Article, I cover three points. First, in
Part I, I suggest that the concept of diversity ill explains the
commitment to minority representation at elite institutions of
higher education. Here I contrast the multicultural claim that
diversity necessarily enriches and enhances the internal life of
the institution with an integrationist claim. 4 In Part II, I exam-
ine whether the admissions programs at Georgia and Michigan
best represent an effort to improve internal student education or
whether they stand for a societal commitment to integration,
primarily of blacks. Finally, in Part III, I analyze the governing
equal protection case law to determine whether indeed a defense
of affirmative action based on diversity would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny, assuming diversity's ill-formed contours consti-
tute a compelling interest.
I. THE DEBATE As FRAMED
The debate over affirmative action has benefited from the
painstaking empirical work of former college presidents William
Bowen and Derek Bok. Together, Bowen and Bok undertook a
broad-scale study of the effects and results of affirmative action
at twenty-eight of the most selective colleges and universities
around the country. Looking at the practices of affirmative ac-
tion from within these institutions, the study presents a strik-
ingly positive picture of student and institutional satisfaction
with increasingly diverse student bodies and demonstrates a
marked degree of academic and post-graduation success among
the recipients of affirmative action preferences. 3 By now there
I borrow the direct juxtaposition of diversity and integration from Professor Estlund's
application in the employment setting. See Estlund, 89 Georgetown L J at 79-85 (cited in note
31).
35 See generally William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton 1998).
36 See generally id.
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are numerous favorable reviews 7 as well as a significant number
of critical assessments' of the Bowen and Bok study. I want to
leave aside the methodological issues concerning both the magni-
tude of the racial preferences afforded at the institutions under
study 9 and the empirical validity of the conclusions drawn by the
authors.4 For purposes of this Article, I accept as true all of the
empirical conclusions reached by Bowen and Bok in order to de-
termine whether they provide a sufficiently compelling legal jus-
tification for institutionalized racial preferences.
The reason for this shortcut is that the Bowen and Bok study
seeks not only to describe how affirmative action is lived and per-
ceived in those elite institutions already committed to such pro-
grams, but also to develop a normative justification for the con-
tinued vitality of preferential admissions. Here, it is well worth
noting how they ground their defense. The book begins with a
historical description of the conditions faced by black Americans
as the United States emerged kicking and screaming from the
31 See note 39.
8 See note 40.
39 See Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative Action
Debate: Bowen and Bok's The Shape of the River, 50 J Legal Educ 284, 287 (2000) (discussing the
relative weight given to race at selected selective schools); Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic
Preferences in College Admissions, in Christopher Jencks and Meredith. Phillips, eds, The Black-
White Test Score Gap, 431 (Brookings Institution 1998). See also Thomas J. Kane, Racial and
Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, 59 Ohio St L J 971, 973-80 (1998) (analyzing the impor-
tance of race in college admission decisions in the early 1980s).
40 Among the leading methodological critiques are Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, Racial
Preferences: What We Now Know, Commentary 44 (Feb 1999), and Stephan Thernstrom and
Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L Rev 1583 (1999). The
Thernstroms pursue four general arguments. First, they argue that even within the Bowen and
Bok data is evidence that the magnitude of racial preferences belies claims of modest "tie-
breaking" on behalf of affirmative action-a point that I do not think that Bowen and Bok really
claim. See Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1595-98. Second, somewhat consis-
tent with the theme of this Article, they argue that Bowen and Bok use the word "diversity" with-
out precision and without any justification of why, when translated into affirmative action pro-
grams, it should be limited to racial considerations, rather than class or particular educational
background. See id at 1623-26. Third, and perhaps most troubling, they argue that, as a conse-
quence of the racial focus of affirmative action and the gap in preparation for elite universities,
affirmative action does not ultimately cause integration but rather conspicuous self-segregation on
campuses across the country. See id at 1605-08. Finally, they raise a number of methodological
objections to the Bowen and Bok study. Of these, the most interesting is that Bowen and Bok
failed to consider the experience of the historically black colleges, which the Thernstroms argue
may produce African-American graduates with levels of professional success and community
engagement comparable to those of the elite schools Bowen and Bok did take into account. See id
at 1614-17. For an overview of the implications of the Bowen and Bok data, together with
that of other studies, regarding the magnitude of preferences and the impact on admis-
sions prospects under affirmative action, see Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 16-20 (cited in
note 16).
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ignominy of Jim Crow. 1 It offers a stark depiction of the formal
barriers confronting black Americans as the nation entered its
modern era during World War 11.2 The account then traces the
struggle to integrate education at all levels through the civil
rights period, culminating with the era of civil rights legislation.'
Of particular significance is Bowen and Bok's treatment of the
1960s as the era when formal segregation was finally defeated
and when the modern commitment to affirmative action took
hold.
This historical backdrop is of undoubted importance, but its
normative implications are not so easily discerned. It seems oddly
ahistorical to situate a current practice in events that took place
before any of the current generation's students were born, and
indeed, before any of the parents of those students entered uni-
versity life without rooting the contemporary institutional
framework more securely in those past events. The authors' at-
tempt to ground the affirmative action debate in history captures
the difficulty that the current university community faces: it is
increasingly detached from any period when the overt use of race
was anything other than a benefit to those subject to classifica-
tion. While I agree with Bowen and Bok that this historical ac-
count must be the beginning of the affirmative action debate, the
attempt to jump from the historic past to the present reflects the
difficulty with the debate as framed.
The difficulty is immediately apparent from the book's struc-
ture. Although the work begins with a strongly evocative history
of the subjugation of black Americans," the following chapters do
not attempt to ground the need for affirmative action in the leg-
acy of past discrimination, nor do they attempt to implicate cur-
rent university policies in perpetuating prior institutional mis-
conduct. Put simply, the study bears little direct relation to the
history of injustice. Instead, it takes up the discourse left open by
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and tries to demonstrate the
benefits of diversity for the educational mission, for graduates
once they leave the university, and for the recipients of the ser-
vices that these graduates might provide. Here the data provide
comfort that affirmative action has yielded some real benefits.
Bowen and Bok make a very substantial case that affirmative
41 See Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 1-10 (cited in note 35).
4' See id at 1-3.




action has positive effects on its beneficiaries" and on other stu-
dents, many of whom respond positively to the presence of a di-
verse student body.4'
But what exactly does all of this prove as a normative mat-
ter? Establishing the success of affirmative action beneficiaries
derails only inflammatory arguments that affirmative action pro-
grams aim to help the unqualified. Bowen and Bok conclude that
admission to selective schools "pays off handsomely for individu-
als of all races, from all backgrounds." This alone hardly consti-
tutes a compelling justification, as Bowen and Bok freely ac-
knowledge:
But what about the other students (most of them pre-
sumably white) who would have taken the places of these
retrospectively rejected black students in selective colleges
and professional schools? There is every reason to believe
that they, too, would have done well, in school and after-
wards, though probably not as well as the regularly admit-
ted white students (who were, after all, preferred to them
in the admissions process)."9
The study ultimately cannot answer the normative question:
"Would society have been better off if additional numbers of
whites and Asian Americans had been substituted for minority
students in this fashion? That is the central question, and it can-
not be answered by data alone. '"° At this final stage of the in-
quiry, Bowen and Bok, like so many defenders of affirmative ac-
tion, have to turn away from the internal life of the university
and from the benefits conferred on the recipients of preferences.
The distinction between the manner in which they identify their
4" This is also the finding of a study of graduates of the University of Michigan Law School
undertaken in connection with litigation over that school's admissions policies. See Richard 0.
Lempert, David L. Chambers, and Terry K Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 Law & Social Inquiry 395 (2000); Richard 0. Lempert,
David L. Chambers, and Terry K Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: Answers to
Methodological Queries, 25 Law & Social Inquiry 585 (2000).
46 Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 220-55 (cited in note 35).
4' A less inflammatory claim is that at many institutions the gap in entry qualifica-
tions creates almost a two tier educational setting. See Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 19
(cited in note 15) (reporting that at many institutions the gap "is very large-one might
say immense-although its precise magnitude probably cannot be determined"). See also
id at 45 (citing reports that the SAT gap at Berkeley created a "caste system").
48 Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 276 (cited in note 34).
41 Id at 282.
60 Id at 282-83.
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own view as educators and how they frame the ultimate justifica-
tion for affirmative action is noteworthy. Bowen and Bok candidly
state that, based on their remarkable experience as educators,
they "believe that our students benefit significantly from educa-
tion that takes place within a diverse setting" in which they "en-
counter and learn from others who have backgrounds and charac-
teristics very different from their own."'" They nonetheless ac-
knowledge that this alone cannot sustain a defense of affirmative
action. Rather, that defense must be based on broader values:
"Fundamental judgments have to be made about societal needs,
values, and objectives."
It is not difficult to conjecture why Bowen and Bok must ac-
knowledge the failure of their data to address the normative jus-
tification for affirmative action. If the book's ultimate claim is
that students learn best in a diverse environment, then the
reader is left wondering what purpose is served by the long di-
gression into the history of state-sponsored oppression of black
Americans. Further, if diversity of the learning environment is
the real objective behind affirmative action, one must wonder
why preferential admission is limited to groups that are defined
to some extent by histories of being subject to official discrimina-
tion. As the philosopher George Sher asks,
For even if diversity yields every one of the intellectual
benefits that are claimed for it, why should we benefit
most when the scholarly community contains substantial
numbers of blacks, women, Hispanics, (American) Indians,
Aleuts, and Chinese-Americans? Why not focus instead, or
in addition, on Americans of Eastern European, Arabic, or
(Asian) Indian extraction? For that matter, can't we
achieve even greater benefit by extending preference to
native Africans, Asians, Arabs, and Europeans?"3
The point is not to claim that there can only be or that there must
be a utilitarian rationale for affirmative action. Rather it is to
inquire whether a claimed defense bounded by an instrumentalist
or utilitarian calculus can rationally fit with affirmative action as
practiced.
" Id at 252.
62 Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 283 (cited in note 35).
53 George Sher, Diversity, 28 Philosophy & Pub Aff 85, 99 (2000).
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The quandary extends beyond the problem with the fit of the
diversity rationale, a point I shall return to in the next section.
There is also the problem that diversity-institutionalized
through commitments to multiculturalism-has moved increas-
ingly afield from its initial expression as a rationale, if a subordi-
nate one, for the integration of blacks into mainstream institu-
tions. The early rationale for affirmative action, whether in the
initial Philadelphia Plan formulation 4 or in its academic counter-
parts,5 was clearly integrationist. Society was taking responsibil-
ity for minorities' past subordination."' Based on this moral au-
thority, a forward-looking claim emerged about the necessity to
improve the status of minorities, with blacks as the overwhelm-
ing case in chief, so as to promote their integration into main-
stream American society. No one seriously claimed that the prime
benefit would come from the improvement of the internal life of
the affected institutions. In fact, there was specific repudiation of
claims grounded in such internal institutional needs, which were
often, as with the case of customer preference, articulated as a
defense of the discriminatory status quo."
Diversity, as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke,' poorly
captures this integrationist spirit. In this regard, it is worth not-
ing the significant difference between the arguments put forward
by Derek Bok in The Shape of the River, and those advanced by
Bok nearly two decades ago. 9 The early defense sought to redress
' See Exec Order No 11246,3 CFR 339 (1964-65), amended by Exec Order No 11375,3 CFR
684 (1966-70), superseded in part by Exec Order No 11478, 3 CFR 803 (1966-70) (executive
orders accompanying Philadelphia Plan).
5 See, for example, Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action in the People's Court, 122 Pub Interest 39,
48 (Winter 1996) (noting that "group preferences may have been envisaged as temporary meas-
ures to help disadvantaged minorities 'catch up!").
An alternative formulation is to think of the targeted groups as having been "created by the
original urjust practice." Paul W. Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice, in
Steven M. Cahn, ed, The Affinmative Action Debate 14 (New York 1995).
57 See, for example, 42 USC § 2000e-2(e) (1994) outlining the rule that a disparate
treatment challenge under Title VII would not allow the employer to raise any claim that
race was a bona fide occupational qualification for any reason, including that of customer
preference.
58 'The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element." Bakke, 438 US at 315. By invoking broad discretion in a university's choice of applicants,
Justice Powell implied that universities are certainly under no obligation to integrate their cam-
puses: "Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The fieedom of a university to make its
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body." Id at 312.
'9 Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern University (Cam-
bridge 1982). I am indebted to my Columbia colleague Andrew Delbanco for directing my atten-
tion to the earlier formulation by President Bok.
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historic injustice and allow corrective justice to apply to individu-
als. The claim was that underprivileged minority students had
been denied the conditions necessary to blossom, that they were,
in effect and under a different metaphor, diamonds in the rough.
Bok's defense was that these students could still emerge as aca-
demic stars if given access to a top university setting.' This de-
fense did not primarily invoke any enhancement to be gained by
the university. Indeed, Bok's firm distinction between student
admission and faculty hiring considerations seems like a direct
repudiation of the multiculturalist claim that divergent view-
points bring internal benefits almost regardless of the traditional
indicia of achievement."' By the time of The Shape of the River, by
contrast, the inquiry had become internal to the university, de-
fined by the inputs of enhancements to the university setting and
the outputs of graduate performance. To the credit of the tremen-
dous integrity of Bowen and Bok, they acknowledge that these
terms are inadequate for a full evaluation of affirmative action.
Hence the issue remains whether the diversity rationale ex-
plains either the origins of affirmative action or the institutional
commitments to these programs. It is noteworthy that leading
early proponents (and present-day supporters) of affirmative ac-
tion clearly staked their cases on the need "to include blacks in
the institutional framework that constitutes America's economic,
political, educational and social life."' The same commitment to
black integration has swung erstwhile proponents of color-
blindness as a principle to defend affirmative action for black
Americans.n I would further submit that, at the end of the day, it
is the overriding commitment to integration that resonates
through even the most sophisticated effort to examine empirically
the effects of affirmative action.
6o "In today's society, blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians have tended to come from
inferior schools and have had to cope with the obvious burdens and difficulties in adjusting to
predominantly white institutions. Thus the failure of many minority students to perform accord-
ing to expectations may well result from inadequate preparation or from pressures and problems
in the university environment that have little to do with grades and test scores. If this is true, the
proper solution is to improve the environment for minority students or provide them with effective
remedial help, not to exclude them from the university." Id at 102-03.
61 Id at 110-15
62 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Burke Marshall, Not Just Color Blind. Just Blind, NY
Times Magazine 42,45 (Feb 22, 1998).
Compare Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public




II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION As PRACTICED
Let me now shift focus to the problems of the diversity justi-
fication for affirmative action in the litigation setting. Because
courts reviewing affirmative action programs under either the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title
VI begin with a presumption against the permissibility of racial
considerations in the awarding of educational benefits," the bur-
den of justification rests with the program's defenders. An imme-
diate problem arises because of the poor fit between affirmative
action as practiced and the premises of the diversity rationale. As
I discussed in connection with the Hopwood litigation:
[D]iversity has very little to say about how an admissions
process works. If a school wants to target ten percent
black enrollment, to pick an arbitrary number, how would
it go about getting there in the absence of fixed objectives?
Clearly it cannot do so on the diversity rationale, unless
diversity is defined in a predetermined fashion along per-
centage lines. Each additional black enrollee brings dimin-
ishing marginal returns in terms of racial diversity. The
first black admitted under affirmative action may bring
significant diversity, and perhaps this is true even of the
black admittee who brings the size of the class to Har-
vard's minimum of five percent required so as to overcome
the negative effects of isolation. But how much diversity is
added beyond that point, and how is it measured against
the first Alaskan resident, or Christian fundamentalist, or
Vietnamese immigrant, or former soap opera star, etc.?
The simple fact is that no admissions program operates in
this fashion. Rather, these programs operate along three
tracks. First, they admit applicants who have the most re-
liable indicators of past performance from whom one can
hope, per Shakespeare, that "the past is prologue." Second,
they admit targets that would not be generated in suffi-
cient numbers by the first track. Finally, they apply
looser, more subjective standards of "interestingness" or
non-traditional achievement to a range of applicants
deemed desirable, but not indispensable. The diversity ra-
' See, for example, Hopwood, 78 F3d at 940 ("[D]iscrimination based upon race is
highly suspect.").
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tionale helps explain the third set of admissions deci-
sions-in the real world of affirmative action, the bulk of
targeted minority admittees comes from the second tier.
To admit desired minorities from the third tier alone
would require an institutional willingness to accept that in
any given year the numbers may fluctuate wildly, includ-
ing down to zero. Given the centrality of the institutional
commitment to maintaining black enrollment at elite in-
stitutions, this is not generally seen as an acceptable out-
come-and institutional policies, most specifically tar-
geted admissions, are the result."
While this issue remained in the background in Hopwood due to
the subordinate role of the diversity claim in the litigation strat-
egy pursued there, it has now come to the fore in the Georgia"
and Michigan67 cases.
Although the mechanics of the programs vary, and although
some findings by lower courts remain to be tested on appeal,
there are certain features of affirmative action programs that
confirm my earlier observations. In the first instance, reviewing
courts must confront the fact that the affirmative action pro-
grams in question do not look or operate as if they were testing
for "diversity." Instead, they appear to be aimed at enriching the
pool of minority applicants or simply seeking to boost minority
enrollments.' For example, the University of Georgia used a
rather mechanical "bonus" system as part of a three-phase admis-
sions scheme to raise minority admission offers." In the first
phase, the highest achieving students-those with the highest
grades and test scores-were automatically admitted without
65 Issacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 679 (cited in note 1).
66 Johnson v Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 263 F3d 1234, 1253 (lith
Cir 2001) (stating that "[ilf the goal in creating a diverse student body is to develop a uni-
versity community where students are exposed to persons of different cultures, outlooks,
and experiences, a white applicant in some circumstances may make a greater contribu-
tion than a non-white applicant").
' Grutter v Bollinger, 137 F Supp 2d 821, 849 (E D Mich 2001) ("[A] distinction
should be drawn between viewpoint and racial diversity. While the educational benefits of
the former are clear, those of the latter are less so."), revd, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002).
'8 This is compounded by the hardening of affirmative action programs over time into
increasingly bureaucratized practices. Professor Schuck concludes that the more contem-
plative, soft initial programs "ossify into programs resembling hard quotas." Schuck, 20
Yale L & Pol Rev at 59 (cited in note 16).
69 See Johnson, 263 F3d at 1240-42 (describing the admission process).
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reference to anything else."0 In the second phase, the Total Stu-
dent Index (TSI) stage, admissions officers examined remaining
applications for any number of twelve traits considered valuable
in an incoming freshman. These ranged from purely academic
qualities to those that might be thought to contribute to the di-
versification of the student body.71 Admissions officers gave each
of these traits a specific weight or "bonus" which was added to the
applicant's admissions score." Other than the academic factors,
race was afforded the most weight." By the very nature of the
admissions process-so many applicants and so little time-it
would have been impossible for admissions officers to look beyond
race and assess the nuanced contribution to diversity that any
particular applicant might add. The Eleventh Circuit focused its
disapproval on the plan's rigidity:
By mechanically and inexorably awarding an arbitrary
"diversity" bonus to each and every non-white applicant at
the TSI stage, and severely limiting the range of other fac-
tors that may be considered at that stage, the policy con-
templates that non-white applicants will be admitted or
advance further in the process at the expense of white ap-
plicants with greater potential to contribute to a diverse
student body. 4
The overwhelming administrative burden of quickly reviewing
applicants meant that at the TSI stage, students were either ad-
mitted outright, rejected outright, or sent to the third and final
stage, the Edge Read (ER) stage." Only at this final stage did
70 See id at 1240 (stating that "UGA selects the majority of its freshman class at an initial
stage which applies objective criteria without regard to the applicant's race").
"' See id at 1241. The twelve factors were divided into three categories: academic, leader-
ship/activity, and demographic. Four of the factors were academic: the applicant's admissions
index score, SAT score, grade point average, and curriculum quality. Five fell into the catch-all
leadershipactivity category- parent or sibling ties to UGA, hours spent on extracurricular activi-
ties, hours spent on summer work, hours spent on school-year work, and first-generation college.
The three demographic factors considered were race/ethnicity, gender, and Georgia residency. Id.
72 See id at 1241 (describing the relative weight that the UGA admissions process
gave to certain factors).
73 See Johnson, 263 F3d at 1241 (stating that "only one factor in the TSI equation-
SAT score or ACT equivalent between 1200-1660 ... was worth more than the race fac-
tor").
71 Id at 1254.
75 See id at 1240-41 ("Applicants whose TSI scores meet a pre-set threshold are ad-
mitted automatically, while applicants whose scores fall below a pre-set minimum are
rejected. Applicants whose TSI scores fall between those guideposts are then passed on to
a third stage, where they are evaluated on an individual basis by admissions officers.").
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admissions officers read a student's entire application and con-
sider the so-called "soft" factors such as recommendations and
essays. 6 According to the court, "Ir]ace, and race alone, may de-
termine not only whether an applicant is foreclosed from a spot in
UGA's freshman class, but also whether an applicant's true po-
tential to contribute to diversity is ever fully and fairly as-
sessed."77
It is one of the vagaries of litigation that, at the trial court
level, the University of Michigan undergraduate admissions pro-
gram survived, despite the fact that it uses a mechanical race
bonus much like that of the Georgia admissions program. On the
other hand, the absence of a mechanical bonus point system did
not protect the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative
action program, which was more open to nuanced evaluations of
applicants. 8 But a closer examination of the Michigan Law School
program reveals that its vulnerability lay not so much in its me-
chanics, but in its objective of enhancing the admission of minor-
ity applicants. As administered, the Michigan Law School sys-
tem had to operate with a predefined commitment to minority
enrollment that made it equally vulnerable to equal protection
challenges. The law school's application materials plainly stated
a commitment to racial diversity and a special commitment to
enrolling "students who are African American, Mexican Ameri-
can, Native American, or Puerto Rican and raised on the U.S.
mainland."' Thus, despite the emphasis on diversity, the law
school had to acknowledge that its goal was the enrollment of
targeted racial and ethnic minorities. Once that was before the
court, the question then shifted to whether, in operation, this was
significantly different from the more mechanical bonus systems
used by the Georgia and Michigan undergraduate admissions
processes.8 ' In striking down the program, the district court relied
on statistical testimony to find that law school admissions officers
placed a heavy emphasis on race, despite the law school's efforts
7 See id at 1241 (noting that "the ER stage is the only stage in the freshman admis-
sions process where an applicant's file is actually read and qualitatively evaluated").
77 Johnson, 263 F3d at 1256.
78 See Grutter, 137 F Supp 2d at 826-27 (describing the University of Michigan Law
School's policy of non-mechanically weighing "soft" variables, including membership in a
minority group).
78 See id at 842 (finding that "the written and unwritten policy" was to admit a fieshman
class with 10 to 17 percent African American, Native American, and Hispanic students).
80 Id at 829.
81 See Johnson, 263 F3d at 1240-41.
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to characterize the racial preferences as no more important than
any other "diversity" factor.8 Of particular significance, the court
concluded that the law school tried to ensure that 10 to 17 per-
cent of any incoming class was comprised of minority students.8
The court also relied on the admission office's use of daily reports
that classified applicants by race to conclude that the school was
actively seeking to meet target numbers of minority enrollees.'
According to the court, the raw numbers, based on LSAT scores
and undergraduate grade point averages of admitted applicants,
confirmed that minority applicants were admitted with lower
academic indexes than their white counterparts and thus, that
race was an important factor in determining whether a student
would be offered admission.' Since the very purpose of an af-
firmative action program must be to raise the admissions pros-
pects of a group that would otherwise not achieve admission, the
"aha" quality of this finding is bizarre. It is only the mismatch
between the objective of increasing representation of designated
minorities and the misplaced reliance on diversity that creates
such means/ends problems.
This mismatch between the objective of minority representa-
tion and the claim of diversity is brought into stark relief in the
Sixth Circuit's approval of the Michigan Law School affirmative
action program. The Circuit opinion focused initially and primar-
ily on the question whether Bakke could be read to consider di-
versity a compelling state interest. Once that question was an-
swered in the affirmative,6 the majority opinion relied on the ab-
sence of a fixed set-aside and the failure to insulate minority can-
didates from all competition from non-minority applicants as be-
ing dispositive.7 In formal equal protection terms, the absence of
a quota sufficed to establish that the Law School admissions pol-
icy was narrowly tailored. Perhaps most striking about the deci-
sion in Grutter v Bollinger" is the absence of any further exami-
nation of diversity as applied, beyond the reliance on Bakke to
8' See Grutter, 137 F Supp 2d at 840-43 (discussing the statistical evidence).
See id at 843 (finding that "the law school wants 10% to 17% of each entering class
to consist of African American, Native American, and Hispanic students").
See id at 842 (finding that the law school administration reviewed data daily in order to
'ensure that the target percentage [of minority students] is achieved").
See id at 840-42 (reviewing admissions data and finding it to suggest that "the law school
places a very heavy emphasis on an applicant's race in deciding whether to accept or reject").
Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732, 741-42 (6th Cir 2002), cert granted at 2002 US
LEXIS 8677.
87 Id at 747-48.
88 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002).
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settle the constitutional question. Even the apparent conflict be-
tween the open-ended duration of affirmative action under the
Michigan plan and the general temporal limitation on race-based
preferences,89 is distinguished as not "neatly transfer[ing] to an
institution of higher education's non-remedial consideration of
race and ethnicity." The exact nature of diversity and its relation
to a specific race-targeted admissions policy remains as undevel-
oped as it had been in Bakke, a quarter-century earlier.
It is of course possible that purely race-neutral programs
that are intended to provide racial representation9' would survive
equal protection scrutiny.9' Nonetheless, it is unlikely that such
programs could either satisfy the perceived needs of elite univer-
sities to maintain a level of black presence on their campuses, or
ensure that the quality of admittees did not suffer from the dimi-
nution of selective criteria.93 And in the absence of other accept-
able mechanisms to achieve minority representation, the central
problem with the programs under review is that they do not op-
erate as if they were really intended to promote diversity at all.
Thus, for example, the Fifth Circuit in the original Hopwood
panel opinion could wax on about the unique aspects of Cheryl
Hopwood's life and how she might contribute to the true diversity
of the law school class.' Similarly, the Grutter v Bollinger9 dis-
trict court questioned the value of racial as opposed to viewpoint
diversity: "[A] distinction should be drawn between viewpoint
diversity and racial diversity. While the educational benefits of
89 See, for example, City of Richmond v J.A. Croson & Co, 488 US 498 (requiring a
"logical stopping point" for permissible affirmative action programs).
9o Grutter, 288 F3d at 752.
91 By now there are a number of such programs, with the lead being taken by the Texas
program guaranteeing university admission to the top 10 percent of the students in any high
school graduating class. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 Ohio St L J 1039,
1047 (1998) (discussing "Texas's ten percent solution" and class-based preferences at UCLA's law
school as race-neutral affirmative action alternatives).
See id at 1045-54 (arguing that a facially-neutral program with the purpose of increasing
minority representation might not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause).
13 This point is well addressed by Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 46-52 (cited in
note 35), and by Thomas Kane. Kane in particular has examined the likely incoming college cre-
dentials in Texas if the incoming pool were drawn from the top 10 percent of all the high schools in
the state. See Kane, 59 Ohio St L J at 987-93 (cited in note 39). For an argument that the Texas
undergraduate program has successfully addressed these two concerns, see William E. Forbath
and Gerald Torres, Merit and Diversity after Hopwood, 10 Stanford L & Pol Rev 185, 187--88
(1999).
94 See Hopwood, 78 F3d at 946-47 (stating that Cheryl Hopwood "is a fair example of an
applicant with a unique background" whose "circumstance would bring a different perspective to
the law school").
95 137 F Supp 2d at 821.
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the former are clear, those of the latter are less so." So long as
the universities could respond only in the language of diversity,
the defense of affirmative action will continue to be vulnerable.
III. THE LIFE-CYCLE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Stages of the Law
A look back across the same historic landscape invoked by
Bowen and Bok from the vantage point of equal protection law
reveals yet another set of difficulties for the diversity-based de-
fense of affirmative action. In retrospect, it is possible to define
three stages of equal protection jurisprudence in post-World War
II America. The first, captured in the Brown-era cases, focused on
the use of constitutional authority to dismantle state-sponsored
segregation and the corresponding use of legislative power to
reach parallel private conduct.9' This period's reforms were un-
doubtedly the most far-ranging and had the most immediate im-
pact on black Americans' lives." Nonetheless, these cases left
many of their normative principles relatively unexplored no
doubt because, once the courts were free to address formal insti-
tutional segregation, the moral condemnation of those practices
under review came so easily. If segregation was constitutionally
suspect because of its role in locking in the second-class status of
black Americans, the most direct approach to dismantling forced
segregation was a straightforward prohibition on the use of race
as a basis for governmental decision making. The Court's adop-
tion of the language of strict scrutiny to address the mechanism
for striking down Jim Crow laws was essentially an afterthought.
Once the Court accepted both the justiciability of the equal pro-
tection claims and the impropriety of the use of state power to
96 Id at 849. This appears consistent with Powell's admonition in Bakke that an admissions
program 'focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genu-
ine diversity." Bakke, 438 US at 315 (Powell concurring).
9' This was the period of the most far-ranging reforms, but it was paradoxically the most
institutionally troubling for courts and the least doctrinally challenging. The focus was on remov-
ing the institutional power reinforcing racial separation-the Truman Executive Order, Sweatt v
Painter, 339 US 629 (1950), Brown, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act are
all examples. This was the "good" kind of reform, the dnd everyone applauds now (though some
like Bork described it as a vision of unimaginable ugliness in years past). The moral force was
clear, and these were indispensable first steps. For an overview of the history of affirmative action
during this period, see Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 43-46 (cited in note 16).
See, for example, John Donohue and James Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights
Policy, 79 Georgetown L J 1713, 1715-22 (1991) (discussing the impact of Title VII on employ-
ment and wages of African Americans).
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enforce segregation, the remaining race codes could have been
handled under virtually any standard of constitutional scrutiny."
The unanswered question of this first phase of equal protec-
tion was whether this approach would suffice. Was it possible to
remove the legal imprimatur of subjugation without addressing
the second-class status that inevitably accompanied it? As many
have argued, the failure to address this question doomed the first
Reconstruction and threatened the second." During the second
stage of equal protection jurisprudence the line of constitutional
authority became decidedly more fractured. A significant body of
legislative and executive action reflected the judgment that the
end of formal discrimination alone, while necessary, was insuffi-
cient. This argument received some support in the courts.'"' The
constitutional corollary was whether judicial equal protection law
could reach conduct or practices that enforced second-class
status, but drew no facial distinctions based on race. As reflected
in cases such as Washington v Davis ' and City of Mobile v
Bolden,"°' the Court recoiled from such an expansive view.
Finally, equal protection reached a third stage when the
antidiscrimination mandate of the first stage was reinvoked to
strike down the use of racial classifications benefiting minorities.
In some sense these cases, beginning with the Bakke plurality'
and continuing more notably with the Shaw line of cases, sig-
naled a trend: the return of manifest racial considerations in offi-
The concept of tiers of scrutiny begins in McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184 (1964).
As Professor Karlan points out, by the time strict scrutiny emerged, the Court was pre-
pared to strike down overtly discriminatory laws as not being reasonably related to a
legitimate state purpose, regardless of the level of scrutiny applied. Pamela S. Karlan,
Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43
Wm & Mary L Rev 1569, 1570 (2002). Professor Karlan observes, "As for the results of
strict scrutiny, its late arrival has had an ironic consequence. Strict scrutiny has been
rather useless to the groups whose mistreatment prompted its adoption." Id.
100 See generally J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the
Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (UNC 1999).
101 The classic formulation comes from Justice Blackmun in Bakke: "In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some per-
sons equally, we must treat them differently." 438 US at 407. That understanding was reflected in
the clear racial preferences granted by the first formal affirmative action undertaking known as
the Philadelphia Plan. See Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 48 (cited in note 16), citing John David
Skrentny, Minority Rights (forthcoming). In Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971), the
Court gave its imprimatur to an expansive reading of Congress's statutory power to address dis-
crimination, by holding that, as a matter of statutory design, disparate impact on racial minorities
in job selection practices would violate Title VII, even if unaccompanied by discriminatory animus.
See id at 432.
102 426 US 229 (1976).
103 446 US 55 (1980).
1"4 438 US at 272-324.
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cial decision making. '°5 This time, however, as is most evident in
the 1990s redistricting cases, overt racial considerations took
place under the watchful eye of increasingly vigilant minorities in
political office or in the administrative side of private power."
The passage of time also robbed the color-blind constitutional
command of its clear normative force. The equal protection juris-
prudence of the 1990s invoked the color blind command of the
first stage of post-War equal protection law,'7 but the invocation
of a formal prohibition on the use of racial considerations was
devoid of its earlier mooring in the attempt to eradicate the caste-
like subjugation of blacks in the Jim Crow South.
Viewed in this light, it is possible to think of the first stage of
post-War equal protection as aggressively addressing ongoing
discrimination by attacking its institutional sponsor, most nota-
bly state and local governments, but also private actors. The sec-
ond stage declined to judicially address the continued effects of
the past, but left legislators and administrators relatively free
rein to continue the process of dismantling the perceived inher-
ited injustices. The irony of the third stage of equal protection
law is that the tools of the first stage are increasingly being used
to dismantle the legislative and administrative discretion that
was the hallmark of the second stage of equal protection law."°6
Looking back with the benefit of watching equal protection
law unfold over time, is there any reason to believe that the same
doctrinal approach should have been used in each of these stages?
We need not import to legal doctrine alone a historical weight
that it cannot bear. Clearly, the re-emergence of race-based re-
source allocation would raise constitutional issues and would re-
quire its own justification. Nonetheless, in hindsight, it is rela-
tively clear that the equal protection mandates that emerged
106 See Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993) (finding that racial gerrymandering of North
Carolina congressional district was subject to strict scrutiny). See also Shaw v Hunt, 517
US 899 (1996) (finding that a North Carolina congressional district shaped to insure the
election of a black representative did not withstand strict scrutiny analysis).
'0 See, for example, City of Richmond v JA. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 495-96 (1989)
(O'Connor invoking specifically the majority black composition of the Richmond City
Council in striking down minority set-asides in municipal contracting).
' See, for example, Shaw v Reno, 509 US at 647 (O'Connor using the phrase "political
apartheid" in condemning excessive racial considerations in redistricting).
'08I am appreciative of Doug Laycock's help in this formulation, although, as else-
where, responsibility for its faults is mine alone. For examples of cases invoking the com-
mands of formal equality to limit the scope of claims for either disparate impact liability
or affirmative benefits for minorities, see, for example, Washington, 426 US 229; Bolden,
446 US 55; Croson, 488 US 469; Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630.
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from the first, and perhaps even the second, stage of development
were ill-suited for the affirmative directives of the third. Thus,
Robert Post expresses the logic of antidiscrimination law as fo-
cused on the need to "neutralize widespread forms of prejudice
that pervasively disadvantage persons based upon inaccurate
judgments about their worth or capacities."10' This limited princi-
ple dovetails with the equally limited argument for affirmative
action put forward by Derek Bok nearly twenty years ago. ° But
these arguments fare poorly in the second stage of equal protec-
tion law, and collapse altogether in the third stage.
Once the formalist apparatus of the third stage of equal pro-
tection was invoked, the integrationist and remedial goals of the
prior two stages of equal protection were placed at great risk. The
formal doctrinal structure inherited from the first stage of post-
War equal protection law proved remarkably adept at attacking
all racial considerations, regardless of purpose or aim. Diversity
emerged in Bakke as an alternative theory that might forestall
some of the most extreme implications of equal protection formal-
ism. Unfortunately, to the extent that Bakke pushed the defense
of affirmative action to rest on the notion of diversity as an inde-
pendent positive good, it compelled a departure from a central
theme of pre-existing antidiscrimination law. Until Bakke, the
leading defense of the antidiscrimination norm was precisely that
it compelled an extra measure of judicial scrutiny to overcome the
misappreciation of ability due to prejudice, crude assumptions, or
cultural bias. Now, the defense of affirmative action had to rest
on the alternative ground of diversity.
B. Diversity Amid Equal Protection Formalism
One might argue that there really is no harm in the miscast
reliance on diversity because, with a wink and a nod, everyone
understands that diversity is really a proxy for integration. There
are two answers to this objection. First, there is the unfortunate
problem that as the diversity nomenclature took on a life of its
10" Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
Cal L Rev 1, 8 (2000).
110 Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower at 279-86 (cited in note 59). This argument is also consistent
with attacks on the selection criteria in higher education by affirmative action proponents as being
unfairly or irrationally structured, particularly insofar as selection is based on standardized test-
ing. See generally Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Model, 84 Cal L Rev 953 (1996); Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History
of The American Meritocracy (Farrar, Straus, and Gimux 1999).
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own, the capacity to address forthrightly the reasons for the dis-
tinct treatment of minorities who had been subject to formal bar-
riers of exclusion diminished. I do not doubt for a second that
there are complicated issues to be confronted in the claims of his-
toric redress or societal obligation for integration. But the diver-
sity discussion as framed foreclosed that inquiry.
Second, there is the inevitable confrontation between the
formal strictures of equal protection law and the diversity-based
defense of affirmative action. In the hands of an increasingly sus-
picious federal judiciary, the robust equal protection tools of the
first stage of post-War doctrine showed the deep vulnerability of
the Bakke-inspired defense of affirmative action. Even assuming
that diversity may serve as a compelling interest, and even as-
suming that universities are able to craft their programs to aim
for diversity in some more refined form, a further problem exists
in the actual implementation of affirmative action. There is a
long-standing protocol in equal protection and employment dis-
crimination law that imposes certain preconditions on any benefi-
cial use of racial preferences. This approach, commonly referred
to as the United States v Paradise1' factors, looks to the tightness
of the means/ends fit and the projected duration of the use of ra-
cial preferences as an integral part of the equal protection in-
quiry."' Under Paradise and other leading desegregation cases,
ill 480 US 149 (1987).
112 As set forth in Paradise, the preconditions for the acceptable remedial use of racial
classifications are the following:
the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor
market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.
Id at 171. The Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v Board of Regents of the University of Georgia,
263 F3d 1234 (l1th Cir 2001), more or less adapted these factors to the university admis-
sions setting when it considered the following questions:
(1) [Wlhether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does
not take sufficient account of the different contributions to diversity that
individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy fully and fairly
takes account of race-neutral factors which may contribute to a diverse
student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or disproportion-
ate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the
school has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral
alternatives for creating student body diversity.
Id at 1253. Although the Paradise factors were articulated in the context of an actual remedial
order in a case of proven discrimination, the same inquiry as to the scope of the program, its ne-
cessity, and its duration emerges even outside the formal remedial setting. See, for example,
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there must therefore be both a direct link between the harm to be
remedied and the remedial program implemented, and a strict
time limitation to the awarding of race-based preferences. Fur-
ther, the timing is presumably to be tied to the lingering effects of
the discriminatory conduct at issue.
As soon as the inquiry is posed in this equal protection fash-
ion, the problem becomes apparent. Because diversity is
untethered to any concept of a wrong, either societal or institu-
tional, it is difficult to fit within the Paradise framework. If the
multicultural presence is an object in itself, then it matters not
what educational disadvantage may have been inflicted, it mat-
ters not whether there is a sufficient improvement in the appli-
cant pool that vitiates the conception of a lasting societal wrong,
and it matters not whether there is sufficient evidence of societal
benefit from the workings of an affirmative action program-as
most systematically pursued in the Bok and Bowen study.
Rather, the claim is that the university cannot function as an
educational institution without the presence of a set amount of
representation from among a preferred group of students-and,
by extension, faculty, administrators and the like. If the diverse
composition of the student body is tied inextricably to the quality
of the academic product, then it must possess "a durability inde-
pendent of our peculiar historical, political and social circum-
stances. It is, in this sense, a timeless connection.""3 As well cap-
tured by Deborah Malamud, transforming the normative defense
of affirmative action into diversity "makes it unnecessary to an-
swer the hardest question about ... affirmative action: the ques-
tion of when it is time to stop.'. 4
Pursuing this argument to its ultimate end, of necessity it
matters not whether the course of study is math or physics or
criminal justice or literature."' Multiculturalism is its own end. It
United Steelworkers ofAmerica v Weber, 443 US 193, 208 (1979) (articulating the same concerns
in the Title VII context).
"'1 Kronman, 52 Fla L Rev at 885 (cited in note 15). This is effectively the position of the Sixth
Circuit which concluded that the fact that the "Law School's consideration of race and ethnicity
lacks a definite stopping point also does not render the admissions policy unconstitutional." Grut-
ter, 288 F3d at 751.
1 Deborah C. Malamud, Affimnative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U Colo
L Rev 939,953 (1997).
1"5 This is a point that gives supporters of affirmative action great trouble. In trying to
explain how the broad claim for diversity plays into the general objectives of the univer-
sity, Sanford Levinson notes quite wonderfully:
I begin with the most obvious tasks of educational institutions: discipli-
nary education and the encouragement of disciplined scholarship. What
[2002:
LAW AND MISDIRECTION
is difficult to believe that an argument structured on these prin-
ciples could satisfy Paradise's temporal requirement for equal
protection scrutiny, were it to get past the other compelling inter-
est and narrow tailoring signposts.
It is also difficult to believe that such an argument could ul-
timately survive any exacting concept of means/ends fit. At the
level of application, most undergraduate institutions have uni-
versity-wide admissions. Affirmative action admissions are there-
fore as readily geared toward mathematics as humanities, with
little prospect that a diverse student body will enhance the edu-
cational offering in the former, even if it could be established that
there is real appreciable difference in the educational experience
in fields such as law.'16 Although there are by now mythic attribu-
tions of the benefits of diversity in all settings, the evidence from
the workplace, for example, reveals that diversity is as likely to
prompt dissension and disagreement as not, particularly at the
early stages of integration.117 Moreover, there is a strong argu-
ment, as advanced by Professor Estlund, that it is precisely the
presence of friction in having to work together toward common
objectives that promotes the social capital necessary for civic life
in an integrated society.118 That is, there may be just as strong a
claim for broad integrationist gains from the fact that there will
be some difficulty in learning how to get along in a racially mixed
setting, even if there is some cost in terms of narrow efficiency
concerns.
Beyond the level of application, it is unclear just how compel-
ling the empirical claim on behalf of diversity could or should be.
does "diversity" contribute to these goals? My answer is vigorous and un-
equivocal: "It depends."
... I am far more confident that certain courses in the humanities and
social sciences benefit from a "diverse" student body than do courses in
the so-called "hard" sciences or mathematics. To the extent that I support
the use of racial or gender preferences in regard, say, to admitting stu-
dents to a graduate program in mathematics, the reasons are necessarily
other than a belief that the quality of the disciplinary education itself de-
pends on classroom demographics.
Levinson, 2 U Pa J Const L at 592-93 (citation omitted) (cited in note 29).
116 See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End ofAffirmative Action at Boalt
Ha//, 88 Cal L Rev 2241, 2331-42 (2000) (arguing that the teaching style in large law school
classes minimizes the claimed benefits from the diverse classroom setting).
117 See, for example, Katherine Y. Williams and Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Demography and
Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 Rsrch Organizational Behav 77,
120 (1998) (reviewing evidence and concluding that "by itself, diversity is more likely to have
negative than positive effects on group performance").118 Estlund, 89 Georgetown L J atl (cited in note 31).
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Suppose, per hypothesis, that students actually learned more ef-
fectively in homogeneous environments because such environs
provided fewer distractions or allowed for a more reassuring set-
ting. Would any serious constitutional scholar claim that such
reasoning would justify the use of racial classifications to rein-
force segregation? Certainly after United States v Virginia,"9 the
expected half-life of such an argument should be very short in-
deed. As a matter of normative constitutional principle, is there
any reason to credit the claim that the internal institutional life
"feels better" is sufficient to overcome the constitutional presump-
tion against race-dependent state decisions? The empirical claim
about the benefits of diversity, a claim that is almost as difficult
to explain coherently as to demonstrate, rests on an odd one-
way utilitarian justification. Once again, this is not to say that
the sole defense that may be levied must rest on utilitarian
grounds. But, were the utilitarian defenders of affirmative action
truly committed to this claim, which is doubtful, they would have
extraordinary difficulty if the empirical evidence were to run in
the opposite direction:
[A] utilitarian must explain why, if we are obligated or
permitted to discriminate in favor of minorities and
women when doing so would maximize utility, we are not
similarly obligated or permitted to discriminate against
the members of these groups when doing that would maxi-
mize utility.''
One could make a similar point about another line of defense:
the accomplishments of graduates who have benefited from af-
firmative action admission.'2' This defense can be seen in the an-
ecdotal or autobiographical invocation of success stories, '2 or in
119 518 US 515 (1996) (holding that exclusion of women from government funded military
college violated equal protection).
,20 A fairly typical example may be found in the following rendition by former Harvard Uni-
versity President Neil Rudenstine, "A diverse educational environment challenges [students] to
explore ideas and arguments at a deeper level-to see issues from various sides, to rethink their
own premises, to achieve the kind of understanding that comes only from testing their own hy-
potheses against those of people with other views." Neil L. Rudenstine, Why a Diverse Student
Body is So Important, Chronicle Higher Educ B1 (Apr 19, 1996).
121 Sher, 28 Philosophy & Pub Aff at 87 (cited in note 53).
' This line of defense is further compromised by the fact that the recipients of af-
firmative action preferences are themselves likely to be from relatively privileged posi-
tions. See Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 66 (cited in note 16).
10 See, for example, Charles Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum L Rev 928, 930 (2001) ("Affirmative action has changed
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the more detailed statistical work of the Michigan social scien-
tists. The difficulty is what exactly this proves. There is an inevi-
table post hoc quality to this defense, as if one could justify the
selective awarding of a pot of money to a designated group by
showing that, after the fact, the recipients were well off. As an
empirical matter, it is as likely as not that those denied admis-
sion as a result of minority preferences would also have benefited,
and would no doubt have contributed to the ranks of distin-
guished and successful graduates of the elite educational institu-
tions. But, again, the more critical normative question cannot be
evaded. Would we allow segregated institutions to claim their
successful graduates as a defense against constitutional scrutiny?
Clearly not.
Further confirmation of the doctrinal rough sledding to be
faced by a diversity-based defense of affirmative action may be
gleaned from recent court treatment of preferential student as-
signments outside the higher education context. A striking exam-
ple is the dismantlement of the ongoing racial assignments used
in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, the home of the long-
est standing judicial desegregation decree and one of the most
successful at actually promoting integration. 4 There, school ad-
ministrators sought to maintain a strict sixty-forty ratio of white
to black students in the district's magnet school program.2' To
achieve this goal, the school board initiated a dual lottery system
with separate lotteries for black and non-black students.2 ' If a
sufficient number of children of a given race did not enter the lot-
tery and fill their allotted seats, the seats went empty despite the
existence of waiting lists made up of children of the other race.1
In striking down the program the court relied heavily on its in-
ability to survive the narrow tailoring test set out in Paradise:
"The policy is not necessary to dismantle the de jure system, is for
an unlimited duration, provides virtually no flexibility and bur-
my life. It has opened doors for me.... I have watched students and colleagues walk through
those same opened doors .... ).
124 See Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte
Schools 2, 3 (UNC 1995) (outlining reasons why Charlotte is a good city to choose for studying
integration).
"5 See Belk v Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 269 F3d 305,345 (4th Cir 2001) (en
banc) (discussing the magnet school integration plan).
126 See id at 316-17 (stating that "CMS had instituted a black and non-black lottery to
achieve racial balance").
' See id at 317 (stating that "[i]f the recruitment drive failed, CMS usually left the
available slots vacant").
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dens innocent children and their families.""" Key to the court's
finding was the indefinite duration of the program: " [t]he use of
racial preferences must be limited so that they do not outlast
their need; they may not take on a life of their own.'"" Perhaps
even more striking is another Fourth Circuit case which struck
down a racially-weighted lottery system in Arlington, Virginia.'"
There the school board's stated objective was to obtain a student
body "'in proportions that approximate distribution of students
from those groups in the district's overall student population,"' in
order to both prepare students to live in a global society and also
to serve the diverse groups of students in the district.'3' The court
bluntly noted that "because a racial classification cannot continue
in perpetuity but must have a 'logical stopping point,' the Policy
is not narrowly tailored," and invalidated the scheme.'32
The fate of the diversity-based arguments in Charlotte and
Arlington contrast with a recent district court opinion upholding
the use of a weighted lottery system for admission to the most
popular high schools in Seattle." At issue were not magnet or
special schools but rather high schools in the district that for
whatever reason-be it location or reputation-were more popu-
lar and were thus highly demanded in the district's "open choice"
program.' 3' In upholding the lottery scheme the court described it
as a "deck-shuffle" that does not preference one race over any
other since "all children" are subject to the plan, and children of
all races may attend at least one of the popular schools.' 3' The
program withstood the Paradise test because this "deck-shuffle"
was effective for reaching one of the goals proffered by the school
board-overcoming the effects of residential segregation.'8 The
court found that this policy would lead to measurable results and
12 Id at 345.
12 Belk, 269 F3d at 344, quoting Hayes v Northstate Law Enforcement Association, 10 F3d
207,216 (4th Cir 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"3 See Tuttle v Arlington County School Board, 195 F3d 698, 700-01 (4th Cir 1999) (affirm-
ing the lower courts holding that the policy was unconstitutional).
'3' Id at 701.
132 Id at 706.
13 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No 1, 137 F Supp 2d
1224, 1239 (W D Wash 2001), revd 285 F3d 1236 (9th Cir 2002).
"4 See Parents Involved in Community Schools, 137 F Supp 2d at 1225-26 (stating
that "schools located in the Northern end of the city continue to be the most popular and
prestigious, and competition for those schools is keen").
13 Id at 1239.
16 See id (stating that "[d]efendants have presented sufficient evidence that a less




would not be at risk of continuing indefinitely but rather would
gradually be phased out as the effects of this residential segrega-
tion subsided and when certain numerical goals were met."" Ac-
cording to the court, the weighted lottery, combined with a
numerical tie to population, was a narrowly tailored policy
designed to defeat the effects of residential segregation.1"
Although the district court was ultimately reversed by the Ninth
Circuit on the basis of a state law that prohibited racial
considerations in educational remedies, the district court's
constitutional interpretation under Paradise remained standing,
for the time being at least."9
While the Seattle case failed to survive as a result of a refer-
endum-created statute that denied any racial considerations in
education, its constitutional mooring in overcoming an identified
result of segregation gives it what defeated educational affirma-
tive action cases lack: a tangible goal that can be measured and
definitively achieved. Schools and universities that initiate af-
firmative action programs with no aim other than to insure a di-
verse and multicultural student body have no such tangible hook
and thus face difficulty overcoming the duration and fit require-
ments of Paradise. Diversity and its cousin, multiculturalism, fit
uncomfortably within the framework of current equal protection
doctrine, Bakke unfortunately notwithstanding.
CONCLUSION
The point of this exercise in constitutional scrutiny is to show
how precarious the world of affirmative action is under existing
constitutional doctrine, even accepting the continued vitality of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Essentially this is a problem of
historical transposition. Who would have imagined as the Brown
Court struggled to bring to life the Constitution to confront the
oppression of black people that those same doctrines would have
to bear the weight of examining the extent to which state actors
may use racial considerations to advantage black prospects for
admission to select institutions? Or, who would have imagined
131 See id at 1238 (stating that "[o]nce a school is considered in balance .. the board
will abandon the use of race in its assignments to that school").
188 See Parents Involved in Community Schools, 137 F Supp 2d at 1239 (noting that the plan
at issue "does not mandate a specific racial quota" and that the plan is sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to "further the compelling interests asserted in this case").
189 Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School Dist No 1, 285 F3d 1236,
1252 (9thCir 2002).
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that the equal protection wars of the 1990s would be fought over
the extent to which states could gerrymander to enhance pros-
pects for minority representation? Who would imagine that the
Court would repeatedly invoke the constitutional commitment to
federalism to restrict congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment? 0 But that is the world we now occupy
and the challenge is to see how well an analytic structure de-
signed to facilitate court dismantlement of formal discrimination
can survive in such a radically transformed era.
Two possible resolutions of the equal protection quandary
present themselves if some form of preferential treatment of
black applicants is to survive. The first would be some modifica-
tion to the Bakke compromise that would blur the extent to which
racial considerations are present in admissions decisions. The
result would be to dampen the express use of racial categories
that reigned in the post-Bakke era in favor of a more procedural
approach which would police the actual practices utilized in
awarding admissions to guarantee that there is not an excessive
reliance placed on race."'
Alternatively, there is an intellectual and analytic tradition
that may provide solace for a substantive defense of affirmative
action. This view finds in the equal protection clause a commit-
ment to the eradication of the legacies of group-based disadvan-
tage. 2 This is a difficult argument to make because it derives a
commitment to an integrated future from the fact of past disad-
vantage.' 3 Its normative force comes from neither the improve-
ment of contemporary institutional life nor a narrowly drawn
concept of compensation to the identifiable victims of past injus-
tice. Rather the focus of this integrationist approach is an at-
tempt to look forward by asking what affirmative steps are neces-
sary for the society to move decidedly away from the legacies of a
discriminatory past. Under such a view, the defense of affirma-
tive action must rest on the ability of society to mend the legacies
of its past and to provide a difficult path to integration for those
"0 See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion LegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L J 441 (2000).
' For an attempt to frame this argument in terms used by the Court in its redistricting
jurisprudence, see Karlan, Easing the Spring (cited in note 99).
14 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Philosophy &
Pub Af" 107 (1976).
3 This also harkens to an older line of desegregation cases. See, for example, Swann v
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 US 1, 16 (1971) (recognizing interest in
the needs of schools "to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society").
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groups that have been effectively left behind. This is undoubtedly
a morally-freighted enterprise. The necessary remedial compo-
nent of this argument invites an identification with past victimi-
zation as an essential part of the claim for present-day preferen-
tial consideration. It invites challenges of a lack of fit between the
likely beneficiaries of preferential admissions, the children of the
most successful beneficiaries of the first successes of the civil
rights revolution, and the continued despair of those minority
communities that have been left behind-and are unlikely to
reap any direct benefit from the preferential admissions pro-
grams in elite institutions. But if such considerations continue to
lay claim to being an important national objective, then the heavy
focus of affirmative action on the elite universities is hardly sur-
prising. Rather it is a recognition of the centrality of those insti-
tutions and of higher education in shaping the society. This is not
a case where an isolated department in a high school seeks to
enshrine its own vision of diversity." Rather, taken together, the
elite institutions of higher education are charged with molding
the positive vision of what the society should look like.
But we should not ignore the significance of the move toward
this older, integrationist tradition. It is difficult to reconcile this
approach with the multicultural, diversity-based defense of af-
firmative action. Under an integrationist perspective, the black
experience in America provides the paradigm for understanding
equal protection as a constitutionally-compelled commitment to
meet our society's ongoing historic responsibility. Oddly, that leg-
acy now compels defenders of affirmative action to explain what
it is about black Americans that requires continued legal protec-
tion. Neither the inward focus on diversity nor the multicultural-
ist championing of divergence-based distribution of educational
resources advances that goal.
14 See Taxman v Bd of Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir
1996) (holding that high school violated Title VII where its decision to lay off one of two equally-
senior teachers was based on race even though the school's motive was to promote diversity).

